Now that we have several credentials in hand from Password Spraying, we should now go ahead and enumerate Security Controls.
Windows Defender
Windows Defender has greatly improved and most likely block tools such as PowerView.
There are ways to bypass these restrictions.
To obtain current Defender status:
PS C:\htb> Get-MpComputerStatus
AMEngineVersion : 1.1.17400.5
AMProductVersion : 4.10.14393.0
AMServiceEnabled : True
AMServiceVersion : 4.10.14393.0
AntispywareEnabled : True
AntispywareSignatureAge : 1
AntispywareSignatureLastUpdated : 9/2/2020 11:31:50 AM
AntispywareSignatureVersion : 1.323.392.0
AntivirusEnabled : True
AntivirusSignatureAge : 1
AntivirusSignatureLastUpdated : 9/2/2020 11:31:51 AM
AntivirusSignatureVersion : 1.323.392.0
BehaviorMonitorEnabled : False
ComputerID : 07D23A51-F83F-4651-B9ED-110FF2B83A9C
ComputerState : 0
FullScanAge : 4294967295
FullScanEndTime :
FullScanStartTime :
IoavProtectionEnabled : False
LastFullScanSource : 0
LastQuickScanSource : 2
NISEnabled : False
NISEngineVersion : 0.0.0.0
NISSignatureAge : 4294967295
NISSignatureLastUpdated :
NISSignatureVersion : 0.0.0.0
OnAccessProtectionEnabled : False
QuickScanAge : 0
QuickScanEndTime : 9/3/2020 12:50:45 AM
QuickScanStartTime : 9/3/2020 12:49:49 AM
RealTimeProtectionEnabled : True
RealTimeScanDirection : 0
PSComputerName :We can see that RealTimeProtectionEnabled parameter is set to True, meaning Defender is enabled on the system.
AppLocker
Application whitelist is a list of approved software applications or executables that are all allowed to run on system.
AppLocker is a whitelisting solution and gives system admins control over which applications and files users can run.
It is common for organizations to block cmd.exe and PowerShell.exe and write access to certain directories but this can be all bypassed.
For example, organization often forgets about blocking PowerShell executable locations such as:
%SystemRoot%\SysWOW64\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe or PowerShell_ISE.exe
To get AppLocker Policy:
PS C:\htb> Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections
PathConditions : {%SYSTEM32%\WINDOWSPOWERSHELL\V1.0\POWERSHELL.EXE}
PathExceptions : {}
PublisherExceptions : {}
HashExceptions : {}
Id : 3d57af4a-6cf8-4e5b-acfc-c2c2956061fa
Name : Block PowerShell
Description : Blocks Domain Users from using PowerShell on workstations
UserOrGroupSid : S-1-5-21-2974783224-3764228556-2640795941-513
Action : Deny
PathConditions : {%PROGRAMFILES%\*}
PathExceptions : {}
PublisherExceptions : {}
HashExceptions : {}
Id : 921cc481-6e17-4653-8f75-050b80acca20
Name : (Default Rule) All files located in the Program Files folder
Description : Allows members of the Everyone group to run applications that are located in the Program Files folder.
UserOrGroupSid : S-1-1-0
Action : Allow
PathConditions : {%WINDIR%\*}
PathExceptions : {}
PublisherExceptions : {}
HashExceptions : {}
Id : a61c8b2c-a319-4cd0-9690-d2177cad7b51
Name : (Default Rule) All files located in the Windows folder
Description : Allows members of the Everyone group to run applications that are located in the Windows folder.
UserOrGroupSid : S-1-1-0
Action : Allow
PathConditions : {*}
PathExceptions : {}
PublisherExceptions : {}
HashExceptions : {}
Id : fd686d83-a829-4351-8ff4-27c7de5755d2
Name : (Default Rule) All files
Description : Allows members of the local Administrators group to run all applications.
UserOrGroupSid : S-1-5-32-544
Action : AllowPowerShell Constrained Language Mode
PowerShell Constrained Language Mode locks down many of the features needed to use PowerShell effectively.
To tell whether if we are in full language more or Constrained language mode:
PS C:\htb> $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
ConstrainedLanguageLAPS
LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution)
Used for randomizing and rotating local administrator passwords on Windows hosts and prevent lateral movement.
We can enumerate what domain users can read the LAPS password set for machines with LAPS installed and what machines do not have LAPS installed.
LAPSToolkitcould be used for the above purpose.
LAPSToolkitprovides features such as:
- Show groups delegated to read LAPS passwords.
Enumeration may show a user account that can read the LAPS password on a host.
Using Find-LAPSDelegatedGroups:
PS C:\htb> Find-LAPSDelegatedGroups
OrgUnit Delegated Groups
------- ----------------
OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins
OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins
OU=Workstations,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins
OU=Workstations,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins
OU=Web Servers,OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins
OU=Web Servers,OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins
OU=SQL Servers,OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins
OU=SQL Servers,OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins
OU=File Servers,OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=L... INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins
OU=File Servers,OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=L... INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins
OU=Contractor Laptops,OU=Workstations,DC=INLANEF... INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins
OU=Contractor Laptops,OU=Workstations,DC=INLANEF... INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins
OU=Staff Workstations,OU=Workstations,DC=INLANEF... INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins
OU=Staff Workstations,OU=Workstations,DC=INLANEF... INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins
OU=Executive Workstations,OU=Workstations,DC=INL... INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins
OU=Executive Workstations,OU=Workstations,DC=INL... INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins
OU=Mail Servers,OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=L... INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins
OU=Mail Servers,OU=Servers,DC=INLANEFREIGHT,DC=L... INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS AdminsFind-AdmPwdExtendedRights - Checks the rights on each computer with LAPS enabled for any groups with read access and users with “All Extended Rights”.
Users with “‘All Extended Rights” can read LAPS passwords and may be less protected than users in delegated groups.
Using Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights:
PS C:\htb> Find-AdmPwdExtendedRights
ComputerName Identity Reason
------------ -------- ------
EXCHG01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins Delegated
EXCHG01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins Delegated
SQL01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins Delegated
SQL01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins Delegated
WS01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\Domain Admins Delegated
WS01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL INLANEFREIGHT\LAPS Admins DelegatedUsing Get-LAPSComputers:
PS C:\htb> Get-LAPSComputers
ComputerName Password Expiration
------------ -------- ----------
DC01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL 6DZ[+A/[]19d$F 08/26/2020 23:29:45
EXCHG01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL oj+2A+[hHMMtj, 09/26/2020 00:51:30
SQL01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL 9G#f;p41dcAe,s 09/26/2020 00:30:09
WS01.INLANEFREIGHT.LOCAL TCaG-F)3No;l8C 09/26/2020 00:46:04Moving On
We have beachhead host compromised.
Before moving on to different hosts, it is better to understand what protections are in place.
Now let’s move to further enumeration on the domain using the bechhead system.